When the office-holders begin to see themselves,--or
rather when the outsiders, the chiefs, and the subordinates all begin
to see the same facts, the same damning facts if you like, the
obstruction will diminish. The reformer's opinion that a certain
bureau is inefficient is just his opinion, not so good an opinion in
the eyes of the bureau, as its own. But let the work of that bureau be
analysed and recorded, and then compared with other bureaus and with
private corporations, and the argument moves to another plane.
There are ten departments at Washington represented in the Cabinet.
Suppose, then, there was a permanent intelligence section for each.
What would be some of the conditions of effectiveness? Beyond all
others that the intelligence officials should be independent both of
the Congressional Committees dealing with that department, and of the
Secretary at the head of it; that they should not be entangled either
in decision or in action. Independence, then, would turn mainly on
three points on funds, tenure, and access to the facts. For clearly if
a particular Congress or departmental official can deprive them of
money, dismiss them, or close the files, the staff becomes its
creature.
4
The question of funds is both important and difficult. No agency of
research can be really free if it depends upon annual doles from what
may be a jealous or a parsimonious congress.
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