If
the Secretary is worth his salt, the very last thing he will tolerate
in his experts is the suspicion that they have a "policy." He does not
want to know from them whether they like Japanese policy in China. He
wants to know what different classes of Chinese and Japanese, English,
Frenchmen, Germans, and Russians, think about it, and what they are
likely to do because of what they think. He wants all that represented
to him as the basis of his decision. The more faithfully the Division
represents what is not otherwise represented, either by the Japanese
or American ambassadors, or the Senators and Congressmen from the
Pacific coast, the better Secretary of State he will be. He may decide
to take his policy from the Pacific Coast, but he will take his view
of Japan from Japan.
2
It is no accident that the best diplomatic service in the world is the
one in which the divorce between the assembling of knowledge and the
control of policy is most perfect. During the war in many British
Embassies and in the British Foreign Office there were nearly always
men, permanent officials or else special appointees, who quite
successfully discounted the prevailing war mind. They discarded the
rigmarole of being pro and con, of having favorite nationalities, and
pet aversions, and undelivered perorations in their bosoms. They left
that to the political chiefs. But in an American Embassy I once heard
an ambassador say that he never reported anything to Washington which
would not cheer up the folks at home.
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