But, of course, among old veterans like the French
troops of 1917, a great deal more is known about war than ever reaches
the public. Such an army begins to judge its commanders in terms of
its own suffering. And then, when another extravagant promise of
victory turns out to be the customary bloody defeat, you may find that
a mutiny breaks out over some comparatively minor blunder, [Footnote:
The Allies suffered many bloodier defeats than that on the Chemin des
Dames.] like Nivelle's offensive of 1917, because it is a cumulative
blunder. Revolutions and mutinies generally follow a small sample of a
big series of evils. [Footnote: _Cf._ Pierrefeu's account, _op.
cit._, on the causes of the Soissons mutinies, and the method
adopted by P?tain to deal with them. Vol. I, Part III, _et seq._]
The incidence of policy determines the relation between leader and
following. If those whom he needs in his plan are remote from the
place where the action takes place, if the results are hidden or
postponed, if the individual obligations are indirect or not yet due,
above all if assent is an exercise of some pleasurable emotion, the
leader is likely to have a free hand. Those programs are immediately
most popular, like prohibition among teetotalers, which do not at once
impinge upon the private habits of the followers. That is one great
reason why governments have such a free hand in foreign affairs.
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