In the Great War previous calculations were upset to an extraordinary
degree, for "out of every nine men who went to France five became
casualties." [Footnote: _Op. cit_., p. 37. Figures taken by
Captain Wright from the statistical abstract of the war in the
Archives of the War Office. The figures refer apparently to the
English losses alone, possibly to the English and French.] The limit
of endurance was far greater than anyone had supposed. But there was a
limit somewhere. And so, partly because of its effect on the enemy,
but also in great measure because of its effect on the troops and
their families, no command in this war dared to publish a candid
statement of its losses. In France the casualty lists were never
published. In England, America, and Germany publication of the losses
of a big battle were spread out over long periods so as to destroy a
unified impression of the total. Only the insiders knew until long
afterwards what the Somme had cost, or the Flanders battles;
[Footnote: _Op cit._, p. 34, the Somme cost nearly 500,000
casualties; the Arras and Flanders offensives of 1917 cost 650,000
British casualties.] and Ludendorff undoubtedly had a very much more
accurate idea of these casualties than any private person in London,
Paris or Chicago. All the leaders in every camp did their best to
limit the amount of actual war which any one soldier or civilian could
vividly conceive.
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