"The evening communiqu? of the twenty-third (February 1916)" says M.
de Pierrefeu, [Footnote: _G. Q. G_., pp. 126-129.] "was edited in
a dramatic atmosphere. M. Berthelot, of the Prime Minister's office,
had just telephoned by order of the minister asking General Pelle to
strengthen the report and to emphasize the proportions of the enemy's
attack. It was necessary to prepare the public for the worst outcome
in case the affair turned into a catastrophe. This anxiety showed
clearly that neither at G. H. Q. nor at the Ministry of War had the
Government found reason for confidence. As M. Berthelot spoke, General
Pelle made notes. He handed me the paper on which he had written the
Government's wishes, together with the order of the day issued by
General von Deimling and found on some prisoners, in which it was
stated that this attack was the supreme offensive to secure peace.
Skilfully used, all this was to demonstrate that Germany was letting
loose a gigantic effort, an effort without precedent, and that from
its success she hoped for the end of the war. The logic of this was
that nobody need be surprised at our withdrawal. When, a half hour
later, I went down with my manuscript, I found gathered together in
Colonel Claudel's office, he being away, the major-general, General
Janin, Colonel Dupont, and Lieutenant-Colonel Renouard. Fearing that I
would not succeed in giving the desired impression, General Pell? had
himself prepared a proposed communiqu?.
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