On the whole it appears to me, that what is called taste, in its most
general acceptation, is not a simple idea, but is partly made up of a
perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures
of the imagination, and of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty,
concerning the various relations of these, and concerning the human
passions, manners, and actions. All this is requisite to form taste, and
the ground?work of all these is the same in the human mind; for as the
senses are the great originals of all our ideas, and consequently of all
our pleasures, if they are not uncertain and arbitrary, the whole
ground-work of taste is common to all, and therefore there is a
sufficient foundation for a conclusive reasoning on these matters.
THE BEAUTIFUL.
Beauty is a thing much too affecting not to depend upon some positive
qualities. And, since it is no creature of our reason, since it strikes
us without any reference to use, and even where no use at all can be
discerned, since the order and method of nature is generally very
different from our measures and proportions, we must conclude that
beauty is, for the greater part, some quality in bodies acting
mechanically upon the human mind by the intervention of the senses.
THE REAL AND THE IDEAL.
Choose a day on which to represent the most sublime and affecting
tragedy we have: appoint the most favourite actors; spare no cost upon
the scenes and decorations; unite the greatest efforts of poetry,
painting, and music; and when you have collected your audience, just at
the moment when their minds are erect with expectation, let it be
reported that a state criminal of high rank is on the point of being
executed in the adjoining square; in a moment the emptiness of the
theatre would demonstrate the comparative weakness of the imitative
arts, and proclaim the triumph of the real sympathy.
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