Appearances cannot well be described except in relation to some theory
or general arrangement of the subject; because the particular detail,
of every part in a complicated appearance, would be endless and
insignificant. When, however, any question in a theory depends upon the
nature of an appearance, we cannot be too particular in describing that
by which the question is to be decided. But though it be sometimes
proper to be minute in a particular, it is always, and above all things,
necessary to be distinct; and not to confound together things which are
of different natures. For, though it be by finding similarity, in things
which at first sight may seem different, that science is promoted and
philosophy attained, yet, we must have a distinct view of those things
which are to be assimilated; and surely the lowest state of knowledge
in any subject, is the not distinguishing things which, though not to
common observation different, are not truly the same.
To confound, for example one stone with another, because they were both
hard, friable, and heavy, would be to describe, with the superficial
views of vulgar observation; whereas science specifies the weight and
hardness, and thus accurately distinguishes the stone.
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