But, in judging of matter
of fact, let us be cautious of deceiving ourselves, by substituting
speculative reasoning in place of actual events.
Nature, as the subject of our observation, consists of two sorts of
objects; for, things are either active, when we perceive change to take
place in consequence of such action, or they are quiescent, when we
perceive no change to take place. Now, it is evident, that in judging
of the active powers of nature from the quiescent objects of our
information, we are liable to error, in misinterpreting the objects
which we see; we thus form to ourselves false or erroneous opinion
concerning the general laws of action, and the powers of nature. In
comparing, therefore, generalised facts, or theory, with particular
observations, there is required the greatest care, neither, on the one
hand, to strain the appearances, so as to bring in to the theory a fact
belonging to another class of things; nor, on the other, to condemn a
proper theory, merely because that theory has not been extended to the
explanation of every natural appearance.
But, besides the misinterpretation of matters of fact, we are also to
guard against the misrepresentation of natural appearances.
Pages:
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288