If for example, granite, porphyry, or basaltes, should be
found naturally formed by fusion, the formation of those stones could
not be supposed in any case as formed by water, although it could not
be demonstrated that water is incapable of forming those mineral
productions.
In like manner, if those three bodies were proved to have been actually
formed by water alone, then, in other cases where we should have no
proof, they could not be supposed as having been formed by fire or
fusion. It must be evident, that an equal degree of proof of those two
different propositions would leave our judgment in suspence, unless that
proof were perfect, in which case, we would have two different causes
producing similar effects. But, if we shall have a sufficient proof
upon the one side, and only a presumptive proof or probability upon the
other, we must reject that probability or presumption, when opposed by
a proof, although that proof were only an induction by reasoning from
similar effects as following similar causes. _A fortiori_, if there be
on one side a fair induction, without the least suspicion of error,
and on the other nothing but a mere presumption founded upon a distant
analogy, which could not even properly apply, then, the inductive proof
would be as satisfactory as if there had not been any supposition on the
opposite side.
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