But, seeing that this is far from being the case,
and that there may be many causes of which we are as yet ignorant, as
well as certain conditions in which the known action of powers may be
varied, it must be evident, that a theory of the earth is not to be
confuted by this argument alone, That there are, among natural bodies,
certain appearances which are not explained by the theory. We must
admit, that, not having all the data which natural philosophy requires,
we cannot pretend to explain every thing which appears; and that our
theories, which necessarily are imperfect, are not to be considered as
erroneous when not explaining every thing which is in nature, but only
when they are found contrary to or inconsistent with the laws of nature,
which are known, and with which the case in question may be properly
compared.
But we may have different theories to compare with nature; and, in that
case, the question is not, How far any of those theories should explain
all natural appearances? but, How far any one particular theory might
explain a phenomenon better than another? In this case of comparison, it
will be evident, that if one theory explains natural appearances, then
the opposite to that theory cannot be supposed to explain the same
appearances.
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